What Happened in Charleston - And Why?

by Lou Angeli

Charleston, scandium (August 18, 2007) -- The tragical fire that snuffed the lives of nine of Charleston's Bravest is the worst calamity harass the fire service since 9/11/01. Of course of study the contiguous demand followers the catastrophe was to mourn the loss of so many great men, and comfort their families.

But now -- calendar months following the incident, after studies and reviews are beginning to flux in. In a nutshell, we're learning that the Capital Of West Virginia Fire Department is operating in the past.

Use of 1" Supporter Lines

One of the earlier unfavorable judgments came from firemen around the country. Video and still mental images showed small, snaking reddish hosieries leading into the building. Are it possible that Capital Of West Virginia made the initial onslaught using supporter lines? The reply is yes – because it's how they've always done it.

These 1" diameter India rubber hoses, known as supporter lines, were banal on fire motortrucks here in the United States 20 old age ago. In most metropolises they were nicknamed "trash lines" and were used to snuff out little nuisance fires. They have got since been phased out in most sections because they proved extremely uneffective during the structural firefight and placed firemen at risk.

Jamy Cote, a former Capital Of West Virginia firefighter, told the Capital Of West Virginia Post and Courier, "The (booster) is usually the first to be pulled off the truck," he said. "Big fire, little fire, it's so deep-rooted to draw the booster." Such safety insufficiencies convinced Cote to vacate from CFD

The H2O flowing of a supporter line is often debated but experts hold that 50 gals per minute is the normal maximum. Compare that to the flowing charge per unit of an Inch and ¾ handline, which are also carried on Charleston's engines., which is 150 gals per minute. Nationwide, these inch and 3/4 hand lines are most often used to snuff out a room and table of contents fire in a single-family dwelling. Potatoes compared to the occupation facing Capital Of West Virginia firefighters.

"With the amount of fire screening upon their reaching at the couch warehouse, Capital Of West Virginia firemen should have got chosen to progress more than powerful 2.5 inch lines," states Battalion Head Bokkos View of the The Queen City (NC) Fire & Rescue. Monsters yes – but at 350 gals per minute, deuce and a one-half hosiery have got got 10 modern times the firefighting potentiality of a supporter line.

Charleston Response SOPS

When a fire is reported, most sections have a pre-planned response that takes into consideration the type and size of the edifice and its occupancy. For example, if the couch storage warehouse fire had taken topographic point in Philadelphia, 4 engines, 2 aerial trucks, a heavy deliverance squad and 2 Battalion Chiefs would have got responded. Count 31 firemen on scene.

But during the real-life fire in Charleston, only 2 engines and an aerial ladder were dispatched. Upon arriving at the storage warehouse at 7:11pm, only 11 firemen were assembled. Their initial focusing was on extinguishing a blazing in the rear burden dock area, with a secondary attempt to evacuate civilians and forestall the fire from spreading to the salesroom and warehouse.

The Firefight

A narration of the incident, prepared by Head Truncheon Goldfedder reads, "As clip progressed, fume began to look in the showroom, and shortly thereafter an outside door was opened near where the (loading dock) fire was raging." At that point the fire entered the showroom, feeding on a wealthiness of combustible – respective dozens of furniture.

Reports are that lone 1 hoseline was in topographic point to support against the rapidly moving blaze. At the same time, starters notified companies that they had received 9-1-1 phone calls from an employee who had go trapped in a cupboard area.

Firefighters rightfully turned their attending toward the deliverance operation, and the firefight took a dorsum place to the most contiguous task. At 7:20pm the at bay victim was freed after firemen had breeched an outside wall.

Following the rescue, firemen should have got been ordered to evacuate the building. With no additional life-safety issues, the firefight should have got moved from inside the builidng to an outside attack. However firemen remained working in the showroom, many of whom became disoriented in the smoke.

News picture shot from the presence of the shop clearly demoes firemen breaking windows in what would normally be an effort to ventilate the inside of the building. However in this case, the maneuver was mis-timed and firemen unknowingly fed the blazing with the O it needed to turn even larger. In Goldfedder's timeline, at 7:25pm the inside of the construction erupted into a monolithic flashover consuming the edifices table of contents as well as the firemen inside. With the shop fully engulfed in flames, deliverance was impossible and by 7:30pm the construction collapsed onto the organic structures of the nine Capital Of West Virginia firefighters.

Early Findings

In recent days, the early determinations from the twelve or so federal and local probes that are taking topographic point corroborate that Capital Of West Virginia is a section that have been (and goes on to be) operating in the past. Here's the short listing of findings…and they're saying it nicely.

Establish Fire Department Safety Military Officer position

Apply incident bid processes on all incidents (ICS – nims procedures)

Rapidly implement force answerability system with passes and PAR

Reinforce appropriate usage of personal protective clothes and SCBA.

Increase initial construction fire response to three engines and one ladder.

Utilize the 3rd engine as the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)

Working fire – despatch 2nd Battalion Chief, 4th engine company and an ems unit.

Utilize the second-arriving Battalion Head as the incident safety officer

Communications alterations including the usage of the 10-code

The usage of the tactical radiocommunication transmission channel for responses.

Changes in H2O supply criterion operating processes with near-term transition to big diameter supply hose.

Use of 1-1/2 inch hose, or larger, for interior onslaught as well as vehicle fires.

Changes to standard nose constellation and flowing for all handlines

Incredibly, the alterations suggested here are not new to the fire service. In fact, they are standard process for even the least of military volunteer fire sections in this country. It implores the question, "What the Hell was Head Rusty thinking?"

Some experts state that the section is so far behind current tendencies that lone a major restructuring could possibly work out the jobs in order to let the section to run more than effectively – and safely. The panels can only do recommendations, so the ability to change, if it is to take topographic point at all, put solidly with the community, the good citizens of Charleston, who rate much better fire protection.

Working in the Dragon's Lair

So what's the problem and how do we fix it? Well here in America, our approach to firefighting has always been one of adopting an aggressive attack, a tactic that requires firefighting teams to make their way inside the burning structure and remain there under even the most severe conditions.

Since the introduction of superior protective gear (Nomex and PBI) in the late 70's, fire-training instructors nationwide have taught their students to conduct an extremely aggressive interior attack, sometimes referred to in the books as Offensive Strategy. The idea is to take an offensive stance, moving nozzles and hose lines deep inside a building to meet the fire on its own turf. But my personal belief is that -- unless a life safety issue exists -- firefighters should never attempt to inhabit the same space as fire. Being there is a lot like snorkeling in shark-infested waters, then poking a Great White in the eye.

According to a report issued by Captain William R. Mora of the San Antonio Fire Department, many firefighters (often Truck company members) choose to begin search and rescue operations without the assistance of an Engine company and their hoseline. The obvious concern in these situations is that teams that have entered won't have the extinguishing tools to cool a blaze should flashover rear its ugly head. And with no hose (or lifeline rope) to follow back to safety, firefighters have no route out! When the search and rescue effort goes south, a firefighter can easily become disoriented and lost in the blaze. Without a buddy by his or her side, they face the unknown alone. Panic sets in and it's just a matter of time before they breathe-out their bottle, collapse and succumb to the blaze.

"The root of the disorientation problem in the fire service,' the San Antonio study reads, 'is the lack of knowledge about the extreme danger posed by enclosed structures and the disorientation sequence."

In many communities, especially those protected by volunteer companies, firefighters sometimes ignore the important fact that fighting a structural blaze is a team effort. Rather than wait for next arriving units, short-staffed companies often begin search and rescue -- or the hoseline advance -- lacking appropriate support and resources.

Crucial to fire extinguishment is proper vertical ventilation, which we've all been taught should take place simultaneously with the hoseline attack below. However, before the chain saw is on the roof, well-meaning hose teams – working alone -- may quickly find the seat of the fire and bravely open the nozzle to dampen the blaze. But with no vent opening to release smoke and hot gases, the team destroys the delicate thermal balance, allowing super-heated air from above to drop down to the floor and bake them like lobsters.

In cases like this, inexperienced firefighters may panic and abandon the line, leaving their partner behind. The team is now separated, company integrity is lost, and it can only go downhill from here. Call in the FAST team.

"Firefighters must be warned of the extreme dangers associated with enclosed structures," says San Antonio's Captain Mora. "(They) must be informed that (waging) an aggressive attack immediately on arrival may be ineffective and unsafe in many cases."

There's no denying that firefighters must enter flaming structures to conduct search and rescue operations, especially when civilians are reported trapped, or the commanding officer feels that an interior attack is warranted. However, changing the behavior of two generations of firefighters, who have had the term "aggressive interior attack" drilled into their helmets, will be a tough assignment for company officers and training personnel. Fortunately though, some more forward thinking administrators have begun to embrace alternate tactics, like large line blitz attacks using portable master stream devices.

A reminder: We're told that the most important tactic in any type of firefight is size-up. So, the next time your company pulls up in front of a burning building, quickly establish command and learn as much about the situation at hand as you can. I f there is no life-safety issue and no danger to surrounding structures, hold back the hoseteam, by their SCBA straps if you must. Wait for second due companies to arrive, then engage in a coordinated attack.

Like they say, "Everyone goes home!"